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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1954
court of appeals held that the sole purpose of the new corporation was
liquidation.10 The transfer of assets to the new corporation was treated as
an assignment for the benefit of creditors. The court of appeals decision
was commented on in detail in last year's survey."' The decision was reversed
by the Ohio Supreme Court which held that after liquidation of -the first
corporation, the new corporation could continue as a going concern.
HUGH A. Ross
CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction
A number of recent cases dealt with the jurisdiction of trial courts in
criminal matters.
Under the provisions of the Driver's License Law' any court of record
having criminal jurisdiction has county-wide jurisdiction within the county
in which it is located to hear cases arising under this statute. The court of
appeals held2 this jurisdiction had not been impliedly repealed by the sub-
sequent enactment of the Municipal Court Act, and that the Municipal
Court of Columbus has jurisdiction to hear and determine prosecutions aris-
ing under Section 4507.34. of the Revised Code. Furthermore the selection
of a jury from residents of the city in which the court is situated to hear
such a case does not violate Article I Section 10, of the Ohio Constitution,
guaranteeing a jury trial. In another case the court held that the Mayor of
Alger could hold court and pronounce judgment and sentence in the City
of Kenton, both communities being located in Hardin County.
In re KelI4 dealt with the county-wide criminal jurisdiction of a mayor's
court in relation to the jurisdiction of a municipal court located in a city
in the same county. The Mayor of Cedarville had jurisdiction to try and
pass sentence on a plea of guilty to driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated
within the city limits of Xenia where a municipal court existed. The effect
of the decision is limited to offenses classed as misdemeanors under state
law.5
While the Revised Code 6 vests final jurisdiction in the mayor's court
to hear any prosecution for a misdemeanor where the accused is not entitled
by right to trial by jury under the Ohio Constitution, the mayor also has
county-wide jurisdiction to try misdemeanor cases where the accused waives
a jury before trial.7 It was held8 that under the former provision a mayor's
court has county-wide jurisdiction, but in this case it was also determined
1065 Ohio L Abs. 237, 114 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio App. 1952).
f5 W~s. REs. L Rnv. 255 (1954).
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that the judgment of the mayor was not sustained by sufficient evidence.
In accordance with the Revised Code,9 the court of common pleas retained
the cause for trial and final judgment. The court of appeals, however, in
construing the other statute,'" held that a mayor is without jurisdiction to
act on a plea of guilty where the accused is not advised of his right to a jury
trial and does not, by affirmative action waive a jury trial."
In another case 2 the court of appeals sustained the jurisdiction of the
court of common pleas to proceed under an indictment against the accused
while a charge for the same offense was pending in a municipal court in
which accused had requested a preliminary hearing but which had not been
held at the time of the return of the indictment.
A related jurisdictional issue involved the legal capacity of the presi-
dent of a city council to exercise judicial power when the mayor is unable
to discharge his judicial duties. It was held that the president could exer-
cise judicial power in a specific case wherein the mayor was disqualified
because he was a material witness in the case."
Another interesting decision upheld the power of the court of common
pleas to transfer a preliminary hearing from a magistrate or a judge of an
inferior court to the court of common pleas where the official concerned is
disqualified. 14
Substantive Crimes
1. Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
Three cases relative to this subject developed certain legal require-
ments of the offense. It was held that the affidavit charging the offense is
fatally defective unless it either charges that the child is a delinquent or
sets forth facts showing the child to be such." It is not, however, necessary
'OHIO REV. CODE § 4507.15.
' State v. Ferguson, 96 Ohio App. 297, 121 N.E.2d 684 (1954).
'State ex rel. Shaw v. Switzer, 117 N.E.2d 333 (Ohio App. 1952).
'95 Ohio App. 425, 120 N.E.2d 609 (1953).
'See OHIO REV. CODE § 1905.02.
'OHIO REV. CODE § 1905.02.
7OHIO REV. CODE § 1905.03.
State v. Smith, 116 N.E.2d 451 (Butler Corn. P1. 1953).
OHIo REV. CODE § 2505.26.
OHIO RE. CODE § 1905.03.
In re Quatman, 96 Ohio App. 517, 122 N.E.2d 32 (1953).
"State v. Miller, 96 Ohio App. 216, 121 N.E.2d 660 (1953).
" State ex rel. Sheppard v. Barber, 121 N.E.2d 438 (Ohio App. 1954).
" State v. Sheppard, 121 N.E.2d 440 (Cuyahoga Com. Pl. 1954).
'State v. Holbrook, 95 Ohio App. 526, 121 N.E.2d 81 (1954).
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that there be a separate proceeding which has resulted in a finding or
adjudication that a minor is delinquent where the affidavit against the adult
charges that the minor is delinquent and the evidence at the trial shows this
to be true. 6 Knowledge on the part of the adult that 'the minor is under
eighteen years of age is not required and ignorance of the fact is no de-
fense.17
2. Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the
Influence of Alcohol
One court of appeals' 8 opinion gives the definition of the words, "under
the influence of alcohol," as:
"While under the influence of alcohol," means that the accused must
have consumed some intoxicating beverage in such quantity that its effect
on him was to adversely affect his actions, reactions, conduct, movements
or mental processes in such manner as to deprive him of that dearness of
intellect and control of himself which he would otherwise have possessed
under the circumstances then existing.
The question for consideration is, therefore, what effect did the liquor
the accused consumed have on him at the time in question.
Another decision' 9 sustained the constitutionality of the "driving under
the influence" ordinance of the City of Columbus, and went on to point out
that the material part of this offense is not the quantity of liquor drunk
but rather the effect that it produced on the accused.
3. Issuing Checks With Intent to Defraud
The Revised Code generally prohibits any person, with intent to de-
fraud, from drawing a check upon any bank or other depository if that
person, at the time, has insufficient funds or credit with such drawee insti-
tution. The supreme court 0 applied the appropriate statute2 l against a
person who was acting as an officer of a corporation at the time of the
issuance of checks knowingly drawn against insufficient funds. The con-
tention that such conduct did not create any personal criminal liability was
rejected.
" State ex rel. Meng v. Todaro, 161 Ohio St. 348, 119 N.E.2d 281 (1954).
"
t State v. Davis, 95 Ohio App. 23, 117 N.E.2d 55 (1953).
" State v. Steele, 95 Ohio App. 107, 117 N.E.2d 617 (1952).
"City of Columbus v. Mullins, 118 N.E.2d 178 (Ohio App. 1953), rev'd on other
grounds, 162 Ohio St. 419, 123 N.E.2d 422 (1954).
'In re Hertz., 161 Ohio St. 70, 117 N.E.2d 925 (1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 957,
74 Sup. Ct. 685 (1954).
"OHIo GEN. CODE § 710-176 (OHio REv. CODE § 1115.23).
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4. Homicide
The supreme court 2 reaffirmed its position that malice is presumed
from the fact of a killing and that intent to kill is likewise presumed where
the natural and probable consequence of a wrongful act is to produce death.
Thus where the fact of killing is proved and malice is presumed, circum-
stances of excuse, justification or mitigation must be established by the
accused unless they can be implied from evidence of provocation and heat
of blood.
5. Felonious Assault by Indecent Exposure
The Ohio Code23 defines indecent exposure by a person over eighteen
years of age in the presence of a child under the age of sixteen as a felonious
assault. The court of appeals2 4 ruled that an actual public overt act is not a
necessary element of the offense. The elements are exposure by a person
over the age limit in the presence of a child under the designated age.
6. Sunday Closing Law
In State v. Haase,25 the court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of
the state statute26 forbidding the opening of a place of business and trans-
acting business on Sunday. Under the statute the exception is work of
necessity or charity, and the court found that opening a hardware store is
not a work of necessity. The court also indicated that a showing of a
necessity is an affirmative defense which the accused must establish by the
greater weight of the evidence.
7. Riot
In State v. Smith 2 7 the appellants had been convicted of rioting. The
record did not affirmatively disclose that the defendants had assembled with
the intent and purpose of doing an unlawful act, or after being assembled,
that they agreed to do any unlawful act with force or violence or make any
preparation or movement for such use. This was not a riot and the
proclamation of dispersal issued by peace officers did not alone warrant an
arrest for riot because of their continued assemblage.
'State v. Robinson, 161 Ohio St. 213, 118 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
" OHIO REV. CODE § 2903.01.
2
'State v. Theisen, 94 Ohio App. 461, 115 N.E.2d 863 (1953).
116 N.E.2d 224 (Ohio App. 1953).
2 OHIO REV. CODE § 3773.24.
'97 Ohio App. 86, 121 N.E.2d 199 (1954). The statutes involved were Ohio
Revised Code Sections 3761.13 and .14.
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8. Included Offenses
While murder in the first degree, abstractly considered, includes murder
in the second degree and manslaughter, it does not necesarily follow that in
a specific case these lesser degrees of homicide must be considered by the
jury. In State v. Dean28 the case for the prosecution was predicated entirely
upon the charge that the defendant willfully administered poison to her
husband with intent to kill and the defense was predicated upon a com-
plete denial that poison was so administered. Under these circumstances
the accused could only be guilty of the principal charge or not guilty of
any crime.
State v. Ross 9 involved a more orthodox application of the included
offense rule. The indictment charged rape of a female under sixteen years,
and the accused was found guilty of an attempt to commit rape. The ver-
dict was supported by the evidence and its form was justified under the
statutory provision 0 which permits the jury to find the accused not guilty
of the offense charged but guilty of an attempt to commit such offense
whenever the attempt is an offense at law.
9. Scienter
Two court of appeals decisions present a seeming conflict of view con-
cerning the necessity of guilty knowledge or scienter as a usual element of
crime. There is a general statement in State v. Buttery3" which seems to
make the element of guilty knowledge entirely dependent upon the exist-
ence of such a specific requirement in the statutory definition of the crime.
This statement, however, occurs in the review of a factual situation, the
unwitting sale of beer to a minor, wherein the type of offense charged
falls within the classes of offenses as to which it has been usual to eliminate
the requirement of guilty knowledge. In Toledo v. Kohlhofer,3 2 wherein
it was held that a city ordinance which was silent on the requirement of
scienter should be interpreted as requiring this element, the court of ap-
peals stated that the doctrine of crime without intent is applicable to but a
limited class of malum prohibitum offenses. The major problem is to
determine whether the statutory definition of crime requires an accused
to know a fact and obey the law at his peril; if it does not, the mere omis-
sion of any mention of intent in the law is not to be construed as eliminating
that element from the offense defined.
'94 Ohio App. 540, 116 N.E.2d 767 (1953).
296 Ohio App. 157, 121 N.E.2d 289 (1954).
0 O REv. CODE § 2945.74.
"195 Ohio App. 236, 118 N.E.2d 548 (1953).
3296 Ohio App. 355, 122 N.E.2d 20 (1954). The Toledo ordinance prohibits the
19551
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Defenses
One decision reaffirms the established rule that the possible carelessness
or fault of an injured party does not have any bearing on the question of the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.13 Also three decisions illustrate un-
successful defenses of entrapment. It was held that a feigned illness on
the part of a police officer for the purpose of obtaining evidence against
a person suspected of the illegal practice of medicine was not an entrap-
ment.3 14 Also the fact that a police officer makes a purchase in order to
obtain evidence of a law violation does not constitute entrapment is reaf-
firmed by two cases.3 5
Criminal Procedure - Arrest
A civil action against police officers for false arrest developed an inter-
esting point on arrest without a warrant. An officer has a legal right to
make an arrest where there is reasonable ground to believe that a felony
has been committed and when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the
person he arrests is guilty of such crime.36 The court of appeals held that
there was probable cause as a matter of law37 where the facts showed that a
warrant had been issued in another jurisdiction for a man with a very
similar name to that of the plaintiff, that the arrest was made on the strength
of such warrant after investigation and at the direction of the police of the
other state and the officers' immediate superiors.
Bail
One court of appeals decision3" ruled on the interesting question of the
admission to bail of an infant detained in a county detention home as the
result of the filing of a delinquency affidavit. Through a writ of habeas
corpus the infant was urging a denial of his constitutional rights by the
selling, offering for sale or exhibiting an article or thing intended for the prevention
of conception. This ordinance seems to have been copied verbatim from Ohio Gen-
eral Code Section 13035 which at the time did not include knowledge as an element
of the offense. Ohio Revised Code Section 2905.34, the present form of the statute,
now sets forth the following requirement: "whoever knowingly sells, .... " The To-
ledo ordinance had not, however, been amended to conform to this change in the
state statute.
City of Cleveland v. Kaufman, 116 N.E.2d 446 (Ohio App. 1952).
' State v. Gutilla, 94 Ohio App. 469, 116 N.E.2d 208 (1952).
' State v. Solomon, 117 N.E.2d 714 (Ohio App. 1952); State v. Ross, 122 N.E.2d
188 (Ohio App. 1953).
- OHIO Rnv. CODE § 2935.04.
3 Johnson v. Reddy, 120 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio App. 1954).
' State ex rel. Peaks v. Allaman, 115 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio App. 1952).
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refusal of the court to admit him to bail pending the date of his hearing. In
affirming the denial of the writ by the court of common pleas, the court of
appeals held that the infant was lawfully detained, and also that he was not
entitled to release on bail under the provisions of Article I, Section 9 of
the Ohio Constitution because the appellant was not charged with an
"offense." The court pointed out that a child committed under the Juvenile
Court Act is not committed for an offense against a law of the State of
Ohio and that conviction of the child does not adjudicate him to be a
criminal.
A case from Cuyahoga County3" considered the matter of the court of
appeals' granting bail after a denial of such by the trial court. An appeal
-had been taken from a manslaughter conviction in the trial court, and under
the Code, 0 since 1949, the court of appeals has the same power to suspend
execution and admit to bail pending appeal as has the trial court. Accord-
ingly, the court of appeals, considering the fact that the appellant had been
on bail all during the pendency of the action in the common pleas court
and further that he had no previous criminal records, determined that the
best interests of the community did not demand that he be held in custody
pending his hearing on the appeal, stayed execution and allowed bail.
Two decisions considered the amount of bail fixed by the trial court,
and in both cases agreed with the decisions of that court. In Ex parte
Cremati,41 the court determined that a sum of $53,500 bail was not excessive
where the petitioner was charged with six felonies and four misdemeanors
and continued confinement in jail was not detrimental to his health. The
other case involved the trial court's fixing bail at $2,000 on a charge of
petit larceny for the petitioner who had made a demand for jury trial only
when his case was called for trial and who had a prior police record charg-
ing him with two felonies. The trial judge doubled the bail upon petition-
er's demand for a jury trial at that late date and no application was made
for reduction of this increased bail. The court held that under all the cir-
cumstances the fixing of bail at $2,000' was reasonable and denied peti-
tioner's original writ of habeas corpus.4& 2
'State v. Barger, 117 N.E.2d 190 (Ohio App. 1954).
0 OHio REv. CODE § 2953.10.
" 117 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio App. 1954).
"'Ex parte Campbell, 118 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio App. 1954). One ground of de-
cision was that the petitioner had not exhausted all remedies available to him in the
trial court, including the application for reduction of excessive bail, relying upon In
re Polizzi, 61 Ohio App. 354, 22 N.E.2d 569 (1939) wherein it was said that "an
application, made to an appellate court, for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied,
in the absence of a record and a showing that all remedies available in the trial court
have been exhausted."
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Extradition
Two cases involved questions growing out of the application of the
extradition statutes. The first,4 3 in denying release on habeas corpus
pending extradition, reaffirmed the rule that the trial judge's function
upon the hearing of a person detained for extradition is to ascertain only
whether or not the sister state has shown prima facie evidence of the crime
and has supported its requisition with proper formalities. The other de-
cision44 applied the extradition statute45 which provides for the extradi-
tion of one who has committed some act in the State of Ohio which has
resulted in the commission of a crime in the demanding state, even though
the accused was not in the demanding state at the time of the commission
of the crime and had not "fled" therefrom. Thus, although the evidence
showed petitioner was not in Pennsylvania at the time of the burglary, it
did indicate that the petitioner had received stolen property in Ohio and
this was held sufficient to justify extradition in accordance with the extra-
dition warrant of the Governor of Ohio.
Indictment, Information, Affidavit
Two decisions in this area are worthy of comment. In City of Toledo v.
Kohlholfer,4 6 the court considered the form of the affidavit which is essen-
tial where intent is a necessary element of the offense. The court held the
affidavit demurrable, despite the liberal provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure because the affidavit did not apprise the accused of a vital and
material element of the offense charged under the municipal ordinance.
The other decision 47 dealt with an indictment which purported to charge
burglary and which was amended following a motion to quash by the substi-
tution of the word "larceny" for "burglary" in that part of the charge which
described the purpose of entry. The court held that the original indict-
ment sufficiently charged burglary and that the amendment served only to
make the charge more specific.
Pleas
In State ex rel Moore v. Avis48 the court denied a writ of habeas corpus
"Millovich v. Langley, 122 N.E.2d 188 (Ohio App. 1953).
"Nagie v. Langley, 121 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio App. 1953).
"OHIO REv. CODE § 2963.06.
096 Ohio App. 355, 122 N.E.2d 20 (1954).
"Herman v. Alvis, 116 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio App. 1951). The indictment charged
the appellant as follows: "unlawfully, maliciously and forcibly broke and entered the
cigar store of Frank Reed and Darwin Frost in the night season, with the intent to
commit burglary therein." The motion granted by the court was to strike out the
word "burglary" in the last clause and insert by interlineation the word "larceny" in
its place.
"116 N.E.2d 39 (Ohio App. 1953).
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brought -by a petitioner who had originally filed a plea of "not guilty" and
"not guilty by reason of insanity" to a charge of first degree murder. Peti-
tioner was committed to the Lima State Hospital for observation. Several
months later petitioner and counsel appeared in open court and requested
the privilege of withdrawing both former pleas and instead entering a
plea of guilty to second degree murder on condition that the first degree
charge be nolled. This requested action was recommended by the prosecu-
tor and approved by the court. It was held that the court in its sound dis-
cretion would permit the withdrawal or substitution of pleas by the accused,
and that upon the acceptance of the new plea the trial court had jurisdiction
to sentence. It was also held that the journal entry could be modified nunc
pro tunc to conform to actual events occurring at the trial.
Presumed Regularity of Criminal Proceedings
An interesting case49 involving the trial of an adult for the misdemeanor
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor raised questions concerning
the necessity of a demand for jury trial, the presumption of the regularity
of criminal proceedings and the meaning of the Ohio constitutional right
of adequate time properly to prepare a defense. Since the record did not
show a demand for a trial by jury and showed affirmatively that the de-
fendant submitted himself to a trial on the merits without requesting a con-
tinuance, it was not held error to proceed to trial without a jury on the
day following the arrest, inasmuch as the regularity of the proceedings was
confirmed by the presumption of regularity and the constitutional right to
further time was waived -by a failure to ask for it.
Problems of Trial Practice
The following decisions on trial matters are worthy of mention. The
trial court in a criminal case may permit either side, after it has rested its
case, to reopen the case in chief and introduce evidence which may have
been omitted and which is necessary to prove its case.50 A defendant
waives his right to rely on error of the trial judge in overruling a motion for
a directed verdict when he accepted the ruling of the court and proceeded
with his defense and introduced evidence in his own behalf, when the ver-
dict was clearly justified by the evidence.5 In a trial before a three-judge
court the court could, after the taking of testimony, have the reporter read
portions of the testimony in chambers in the absence of the accused with-
"State v. Edwards, 117 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio App. 1952).
General Electric Co. v. International Union, 118 N.E.2d 708 (Hamilton Com. Pl.
1953).
"State v. Eyer, 121 N.E.2d 322 (Ohio App. 1953).
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out violating the constitutional right of the accused to be present at the
trial, the incident occurring during the deliberations of the court and being
analogized to the situation where the jury is deliberating its verdict.5" A
deliberate disobedience of an order not to make photographs at an arraign-
ment was held to constitute a contempt of court punishable under the
statues of Ohio.53
Evidence
There were few novel evidence problems presented during the report-
ing period. One case, relative to a bribery prosecution, reaffirmed the
established Ohio rule that a guilty verdict may rest on the uncorroborated
evidence of an accomplice, the credit to be given such testimony resting
exclusively with the jury.54 Another decision was based on the rule that
unfavorable inferences may be drawn from the failure of the accused to
take the stand.5
One reported trial court opinion5" considered the problem of the use
of admissions against interest in a criminal trial. Some preliminary proof
of the voluntary character of the declaration is necessary to establish ad-
missibility at the actual trial, but the mere showing of the admission with-
out objection is sufficient. The instant case5 also was concerned with the
matter of admitting a confession of a person made while under the influ-
ence of alcohol, holding that such a condition does not render the confession
inadmissible and that the weight and sufficiency thereof may be considered
by the jury in the light of the circumstances.
Another case concerned the proper function of the trial court in acting
upon a defense request to examine and make copies of a report of the re-
sults of a voluntary blood test to determine percentage of alcohol content.
The court,58 after determining that a trial court must exercise its discretion
as to whether the request should be granted, held that under the circum-
stances the defense had other methods available for obtaining the informa-
tion desired and denied the request.
Instructions
Decisions on three questions concerning instructions in criminal trials
are worthy of comment. It is necessary that the jury be told that they "must"
1
2 State v. Demmna, 161 Ohio St. 54, 117 N.E.2d 425 (1954).
' State v. Clifford, 97 Ohio App. 1, 118 N.E.2d 853 (1954), aff'd., 162 Ohio St.
370, 123 N.E.2d 8 (1954).
" State v. Neal, 117 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio App. 1954).
55City of Akron v. Stouffis, 96 Ohio App. 105, 121 N.E.2d 307 (1953).
"Middletown v. Dennis, 120 N.E.2d 903 (Middletown Mun. Ct. 1954).
7 Ibid.
' State v. Regedanz, 120 N.E.2d 480 (Mercer Com. Pl. 1953).
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find that an accused had the right of self-defense when the evidence favora-
ble to a plea of self-defense preponderates.5 9 When "lesser included of-
fenses" are in fact injected into the trial by testimony sufficient to make
them issues in the case, there is a positive duty on the court to charge as to
these lesser included offenses. 0 Where an instruction is correct but in-
complete in some details it is the duty of defense counsel to request the court
to charge further, and in the absence of such a request, the omission of the
court to supply the deficiency does not justify a reversal.6 '
Sentence
A variety of problems arose under this tide, including an adjudication
of the validity of the statute"2 relative to sex offenders, mentally ill and
psychopathic personalities providing for the mandatory commitment of
anyone, except first degree murderers without recommendation of mercy,
for observation and examination prior to sentence.63 The statute was
upheld as a reasonable regulation not violative of the prisoner's rights under
the United States and Ohio constitutions. When the prisoner has been
convicted of a felony, even after a plea of guilty, the trial court must sen-
tence generally, and if a specific sentence is given, it will be treated as a
general one subject to the statutes, and the sentence to a specific term is not
void. 6 4 It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to order indeterminate
sentences of not less than six months and not more than five years on each
of two counts to be served consecutively. " Upon revocation of an order
of probation and re-sentencing, no time is to be allowed for the period the
prisoner was free on probation.00
"State v. Collins, 94 Ohio App. 401, 115 N.E.2d 844 (1952).
' State v. Quatman, 122 N.E.2d 670 (Ohio App. 1954). The defendant was charged
with assault with intent to kill but was convicted of the lesser offense of assault with
menacing threats. There was also evidence of a simple assault as to which the court
omitted to charge.
State v. Elfrink, 161 Ohio St. 549, 120 N.E.2d 83 (1954).
' Ohio Revised Code Section 2947.25, providing that after conviction and before
sentence, the trial court must refer for examination all persons convicted under Sec-
tions 2903.01, 2905.02, 2905.03, .04, .07, .44 of the Revised Code, to the depart-
ment of public welfare or to a state facility designated by the department, or to a
psychopathic clinic approved by the department, or to three psychiatrists.
' State v. Ross, 96 Ohio App. 157, 121 N.E.2d 289 (1954).
"In re Smith, 162 Ohio St. 58, 120 N.E.2d 736 (1954).
'State v. Hashmall, 160 Ohio St. 565, 117 N.E.2d 606 (1954). The court's opin-
ion states that the record disclosed that the trial court probably ordered the sentences
to run consecutively because he was advised that defendant was a Communist. The
court comments that even a communist is entitled to even-handed justice.
' Schimpf v. Alvis, 94 Ohio App. 427, 115 N.E.2d 856 (1952).
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Probation and Parole
The effect of -granting probation is to suspend the sentence the prisoner
is serving.67 The running of the sentence is interrupted for the entire
length of the probation.
An interesting parole violation case presented a dual question: (1)
What are adequate charges of violation of parole; and (2) what is the
liability of a public official for contempt in disobeying an order releasing
the alleged parole violator on bond pending an appeal. In Ex parte Karnes"s
it was determined that the refusal to obey the arbitrary orders of a field coun-
selor of the Girls' Industrial School could not be the basis for a revocation of
parole. In a companion case,69 the Superintendent of the Industrial School
who actively participated in the preceding habeas corpus case and who
knew of the appellate court's order granting release on bond pending appeal
of the trial court's order, was held in contempt.
Criminal Appeals
The refusal to issue a write of habeas corpus on behalf of a petitioner
charged with parole violation is reviewable on appeal by statute; 0 such
refusal is also an order affecting a substantial right within the contempla-
tion of Article IV Section 6, of the Ohio Constitution. The court of ap-
peals therefore has ample jurisdiction to consider the appeal.71
In State v. Robinson72 the supreme court determined that the court of
appeals' reducing a conviction of second degree murder to manslaughter
is not a reversal on the weight of the evidence, and therefore the supreme
court has jurisdiction to determine whether the court of appeals was war-
ranted in substituting its judgment as to the facts shown by the evidence for
that of the trial court. Also the state, if it chose, could appeal from the
final order of the court of appeals imposing sentence.
An interesting question of possible abandonment of an appeal was
presented in Village of Avon v. Popa.73 Defendant had been convicted
in the mayor's court and had appealed to the court of common pleas. Be-
fore hearing in common pleas court but not before filing a motion for new
Ibid.
SEx parte Karnes, 121 N.E.2d 156 (Ohio App. 1953).
Ibid.
70OHIO REV. CODE § 2725.26.
"Ex parte Karnes, 121 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio App. 1953).
"161 Ohio St. 213, 118 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
"96 Ohio App. 147, 121 N.E.2d 254 (1953).
[Spring
